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QUOTAS, POLITICS, AND JUDICIAL STATESMANSHIP:




The term "quota" as part of national political discourse had its most
recent major airing in the legislative process leading to passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.1 The term had more extended, but more muted, airing
in the civil rights jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court in the
years just before and just after the retirement of Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. The term also underlay, but was not explicitly aired in, Justice Powell's
controlling opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.2 In
each of these contexts the rhetorical power of the term was apparent, but
only in Bakke, a case that touched the core of national anxiety on the
question of race and opportunity, was the term "quota" not used for its
most powerful political effect. That restraint is an important feature of an
opinion that captures much of what makes Justice Powell, in Professor
Powe's phrase on the pages of this symposium, "a quintessential centrist."'
Centrism, however, suggests a point on the political spectrum. Other
common characterizations of Powell's work have less obvious political
content-characterizations of the Justice as the pragmatist, the conciliator,
and the skilled judicial craftsman. 4 But Powell's particular compromise on
the difficult and emotionally charged issue in Bakke invites the view that
there may be even more-that perhaps the decision transcended the ordinary
judicial act and represented a form of statesmanship.
5
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the support of the Frances Lewis Law Center and the thoughtful
comments of Gwen Handelman, Lash LaRue, Brian Murchison and Joan Shaughnessy on an
earlier draft of this essay.
1. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. L.A. Powe, Jr., The Court Between Hegemonies, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 31, 31
(1992).
4. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARv. L.
Rav. 409 (1987).
5. The term "statesmanship" is applied to Justice Powell's approach to constitutional
adjudication in Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The
Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 56-59 (1987). As used there, it is intended
as a criticism of an approach that sought to "balance" competing community interests and
thereby "usurped the functions of the political institutions of government." Id. at 5. This
essay does not use the term as a form of criticism, but there is a relationship between Professor
Kahn's critique and some of the issues raised here. See infra Part II.
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This essay is addressed to that question. It first undertakes to establish
the contemporary relevance of Bakke to issues of state, particularly the
rhetoric of racial politics as it developed in the recent passage of new
federal civil rights legislation. The essay then considers what statesmanship
in that context might mean. Finally, it addresses the content, and the
possible internal contradiction, of a notion of statesmanship applied to
judging, with particular attention to Powell's Bakke.
The term statesmanship is widely and often loosely used in the political
process. Despite the vagaries of its meaning there, its use is well-accepted.
In the judicial process, however, both the applicability of the term states-
manship and its content are more problematic. It is not the purpose of this
essay to resolve those definitional issues; rather, it is to explore in a
preliminary fashion possible differences in the concept of statesmanship in
the political and the judicial contexts. The use of the term "quota" in the
debate over the recent civil rights act and in Powell's Bakke provides the
vehicle for that exploration.
I. CivrL RIGHTS PoLITIcs AND THE RHETORIC OF "QUOTA"
Underlying the heated political debate that culminated in passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 were several somewhat technical and not widely
understood elements of one of the two central forms of unlawful conduct
under Title VII (the employment title) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6
Under Title VII, unlawful racial discrimination is established (1) if an
employment decision is intentionally based on race; or (2) if an employment
decisionmaking standard, for example a test score, has a disproportionate
racial impact, and its use cannot be justified as a business necessity.
The latter theory of unlawful conduct, not made explicit in the statute,
was first articulated by the Court in 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 7
The Griggs Court found that, beyond prohibiting intentional discrimination,
Congress intended to prohibit employment practices that "are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation" to avoid creating "built-in headwinds"
for minority opportunity. 8 Under Griggs, an employment decisionmaking
standard that operates disproportionately to exclude members of a racial
group is prohibited if it "cannot be shown to be related to job perform-
ance." 9 Thus, once the disparate impact of an employment standard is
shown the issue becomes the business need for the standard, not employer
intent in adopting it.
The Griggs decision by its terms required a comparison of the impact
of an employment standard on one racial group with the impact of that
standard on another and then a determination of whether that impact was
"disproportionate." The determination of disproportionality, in turn, often
6. 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1988).
7. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
9. Id. at 431.
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required reference to "proportions" of those groups in the relevant labor,
market, for example, the racial distribution in a labor market of persons
holding a particular educational degree or professional certificate. Thus, the
Griggs line of proof made consciousness of the racial composition of
selection pools essential to anticipating possible liability from using particular
employment criteria.
As long as a single employment standard such as a degree requirement
or test score was at issue, attention to the racial composition of the labor
market and the impact of the standard on identified racial groups was
relatively noncontroversial. Even if a particular standard had a dispropor-
tionate impact, and was unjustifiable as a matter of business necessity, the
relationship between the racial composition of the existing workforce gen-
erally and the labor market was not at issue. Instead, the impact of the
single standard was the only issue. But when employment decisionmaking
was viewed more broadly as being based on a combination of standards,
some objective and others subjective, it appeared to follow under Griggs
that the impact of the combined standards (e.g., the racial distribution of
the outcomes of all hiring decisions based on those standards) could be
tested against the racial composition of the relevant labor market. If the
differential was disproportionate, then presumably the full set of standards
had to be business justified to survive challenge.
Because most important employment decisions (hirings and promotions,
particularly) are based on multiple factors, this approach, if applied loosely,
could be understood to require employment decisionmaking that approxi-
mated the racial composition of the relevant labor market. Although this
prospect may have been more theoretical than real, it formed a part of the
rationale for the 1989 Supreme Court decision in Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio,10 which set a number of limits on the Griggs doctrine, at least
one of which would have precluded liability based on that broad theory.
Wards Cove required that employment standards be separated for the
purpose of impact analysis and that a causal link be established between
each standard and an alleged effect on the outcome of employment deci-
sionmaking in a particular workplace.
The Wards Cove decision also emphasized the importance of careful
analysis in determining the proportion of "qualified" workers in the relevant
labor market against which impact would be tested. Further, the Court
redefined "business necessity" and allocated the burden of persuasion on
the "business necessity" defense to the plaintiff, essentially making it a
burden of establishing the absence of a business need for the employment
decisionmaking standard that produced the impact. Explaining its emphasis
on close attention to the question of the percentage of "qualified" workers
in the relevant labor market, the Wards Cove Court observed that any less
searching analysis might leave "racial quotas" as "the only practicable
option for many employers."'"
10. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
11. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 643 (1989).
1992]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:53
The Wards Cove Court's reference to quotas was in the context of an
evidentiary issue that had long been of concern to plaintiffs and defendants
in Title VII litigation of both the impact and the intent type. Any consid-
eration of the probative value of a comparison of a selected group with a
potential pool for selection requires sensitivity to the question of the
characteristics of the pool, particularly "qualifying" characteristics. When
the qualifying characteristics are distributed disproportionately among dif-
ferent racial groups, any disproportionate outcomes in employment deci-
sionmaking would likely be explained on the basis of qualification rather
than race. The determination of the distribution of characteristics, however,
is itself a difficult evidentiary matter and often must be made on the basis
of less than ideal data. Despite the fact that the Court's reference to quotas
was in this proof context, it provided some basis for viewing the entire
opinion as being addressed to concern about race-oriented employment
quotas.
12
The notable reaction to Wards Cove was not so much relief from the
employer community that the proof process for disparate impact cases had
been made more "exacting," but outrage from the civil rights community
that Griggs had been "undermined." Reversing Wards Cove, along with
several other Supreme Court decisions from the late 1980s that were viewed
by civil rights organizations, among others, as hostile to vigorous enforce-
ment of the civil rights law,13 became a political objective that met generally
with Democratic support and Republican resistance. The overall theme in
the legislative effort was the restoration of employment discrimination law
that had been restricted by the Supreme Court, but a number of the bills
introduced in Congress went beyond merely reversing Court decisions and
thus widened the range of policy choices.1 4 The timing of these political
developments virtually assured that the underlying issues would be aired in
the 1990 congressional campaigns.
Shortly after the major Democratic bills were introduced in Congress
in 1989, the White House adopted a legislative strategy that continued for
the next two years, initially leading to a presidential veto and ultimately
resulting in the compromise legislation that became the Civil Rights Act of
1991. In its simplest and most effective form, the strategy was to label the
Democratic proposals as "quota bills" and to offer a less far-reaching bill
as a reasonable, "nonquota" alternative. Putting aside for a moment the
question of the accuracy of the label or the nature of the differences in the
bill the President vetoed and the bill he finally signed, the strategy clearly
12: Whether or not that concern in fact motivated the other principles established in
Wards Cove, a formal connection of those principles to possible defensive reliance by employers
on quotas would have required different analysis and was not made explicit by the Court.
13. E.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
14. The most significant proposed expansion of the original act was the inclusion of a
provision for compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination and a jury
trial right to implement the damages provision.
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worked. The label, and the negative imagery it cyeated, became the focal
point for public discourse on the proposed legislation. The consistent
message from the White House was that the President wanted a "civil
rights" bill but would not agree to a "quota" bill. Congressional Democrats
supporting the original measure were forced to respond in those terms and
defend their initiative against the quota charge.
Throughout the period the legislation was pending, little effort was
made by those charging "quota" to explain what that term meant or why
the bill should be characterized in that fashion. The term itself, particularly
in the context of civil rights, easily tapped into a large reservoir of negative
public sentiment without the need for elaboration or explanation. In a sense,
the broad policy questions that had been before the nation for more than
two decades under the rubric of affirmative action and all the fears and
hopes that concept entailed were collapsed into a single term. Some politi-
cians quickly realized the power of the term and, whatever may have been
the intentions of the White House, exploited its value in furthering what
have come to be called "wedge" issues.
One of the most extreme forms of this campaign technique appeared
in the Senatorial race between incumbent North Carolina Senator Jesse
Helms and challenger Harvey Gantt. A Helms' television ad showed a white
man's hand crumpling a job rejection letter. "You needed that job and you
were the best qualified," a background voice intones. "But they had to
give it to a minority because of a racial quota. Is that really fair? Harvey
Gantt says it is. Gantt supports Ted Kennedy's racial quota law that makes
the color of your skin more important than your qualifications.""u
It was not particularly surprising that a candidate who began his political
career as a critic of civil rights legislation would, when sensing a threat to
his incumbency, return to old themes. But the thought that the same imagery
might have been intended by the President, or those close to him, raised
the stakes for understanding just what was meant by "quota" as applied
to the pending legislation.
The answer never came, or at least never in a form that could compete
with the sheer power of the term "quota." The real answer was bound up
in the details of relatively complex legislation and an even more complex
body of judicial opinion that had developed under Title VII. The statute
had long been construed to recognize as probative on the issue of intentional
discrimination the racial composition of the employer's workforce as com-
pared to the qualified workforce in the relevant labor market. 16 A disparity
15. Thomas B. Edsall, Helms Injects Race Issue Into Carolina Campaign, WAsH. Post,
Nov. 1, 1990, at Al.
16. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 n.19 (1973). The Green
Court noted:
The District Court [on remand] may ... determine, after reasonable discovery that
"the [racial] composition of defendant's labor force is itself reflective of restrictive
or exclusionary practices." . . . We caution that such general determinations, while
helpful, may not be in and of themselves controlling as to an individualized hiring
19921
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between the workforce and the relevant labor market did not constitute a
violation of the statute; it was only one form of evidence among many that
was thought to bear on employer intent. Its possible evidentiary role,
however, could be thought of as having the potential to encourage employers
to match labor market statistics in hiring to avoid liability. Similarly, as
noted earlier, the Griggs disparate impact analysis required some attention
to labor market statistics. In those cases, employer concern with such data
might also be thought of as encouraging defensive behavior. Finally, the
very existence of an antidiscrimination statute such as Title VII, which
could lead to substantial monetary liability, might trigger defensive employ-
ment decisionmaking, and some caselaw upholding voluntary affirmative
action programs was predicated on that presumed employer purpose. 1
7
Given this background, understanding what in fact Wards Cove had
done and, in turn, what the proposed legislation might undo was a question
that could only be answered by a more sophisticated understanding of the
issues than the term "quota" would permit. Furthermore, it was clear that
if the label was to be applied to the pending bill and the labeler was not
to be understood simply as proposing general retrenchment in employment
discrimination law, then "quota bill" had to mean more than a bill that
would continue to encourage the defensive posturing that had been stimu-
lated by the original Act and that had been maintained by the judicial
construction given the Act over more than twenty-five years. Those impor-
tant and not so subtle differences were not ones opponents of the legislation
felt any need to address as long as the quota label could generate wide
negative reaction to the bill.
The term "quota" had developed a negative connotation in American
politics at least as early as the 1920s and 1930s as the term used to describe
limitations on the number of immigrants from particular countries." At the
same time, the term was used with less opprobrium to describe import
restrictions on foreign commercial goods. The negative connotation was
reinforced by association of the term with the practice of many institutions
of higher education of limiting the number of students and faculty of
particular religions. The negativity of the term in these and other similar
instances of its use presumably flowed not only from the particular char-
acteristic chosen as the basis for the linedrawing, but also from discomfort
with the subsidiary notion that a group's representation in the general
population should constitute the limit of its access to educational or em-
ployment opportunities.
From this background, it was sometimes argued that an "inclusionary,"
as opposed to an "exclusionary," quota was less objectionable, and that
decision, particularly in the presence of an otherwise justifiable reason for refusing
to rehire.
Id. (citations omitted).
17. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209-216 (1979) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
18. See 3 OxroRw ENGLISH DICTIONARY 988 (Supp. 1982).
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such a quota was particularly "benign" if the newly included group had
itself previously suffered exclusionary discrimination and the quota was
established to remedy the prior exclusion. Despite some appeal, this argu-
ment generally fell victim to the logic that, at least where quotas are simply
numerical formulas for decisionmaking, one person's inclusion is no more
than another's exclusion. The less negative term for decisional targets that
were conscious of, and intended in part to remedy, prior discrimination
became "goal." While that term never fully overcame a similar intimation
of reverse exclusion, the connotation was generally more favorable because
of the absence of the sense of numerical rigidity.
One might then argue that as long as the proposed civil rights legislation
did not require fixed hiring percentages based on relevant labor market
data, the bill was not a "quota bill." In fact the bill did not, and the
White House virtually conceded as much when the President signed a quite
similar subsequent bill. The most the vetoed measure could be said to have
done in this regard was restructure the proof process for disparate impact
cases in a way that would make employers to some unspecified degree more
likely than under Wards Cove to engage in goal-setting behavior. The
revisions in the bill that became law had the virtue, from the President's
perspective, of less strongly encouraging that behavior to an equally unspe-
cified degree. Could one then conclude that the quota label was clearly
wrong and was simply dangerous and divisive rhetorical excess designed to
appeal to voters along racial lines?
The answer seems largely a function of one's level of tolerance for
expedient discourse in the political process. For instance, the White House
might have argued that, despite questions about the accuracy of the powerful
label it used, the use of the term quota was dictated by the need to obtain
a political compromise when the other side was invoking the equally
powerful term "civil rights restoration." That reaction has considerable
force if one expects no more of political actors than to invoke publicly the
most powerful symbol or imagery that serves their policy objectives, despite
how seriously that may obscure for the public the substance of the policy.
That reaction has even more force if one is also convinced that the
complexity of the underlying issues makes them generally inaccessible to all
but expert segments of the public. Yet, however reasonable those reactions
may be for some policy issues, they pose special risks for others. Race
discrimination and its possible remedies present uniquely difficult issues on
which to achieve public consensus if political discourse is conducted in
dichotomous code. In essence, the exchange begins to mirror a sort of
name-calling behavior that is itself more reflective of the disease than the
cure.
Without question, however, there were limits to the interest and capacity
of the lay public to understand the nuances of change in a complex legal
regime such as Title VII. Moreover, efforts to speak more directly to those
issues would have posed risks for politicians on either side, including the
most immediate risk of failing in the legislative objective. Yet even if such
efforts had accomplished no more than making the public better aware of
19921
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that complexity, they might fairly have been labeled acts of statesmanship-
acts in which immediate political advantage is sacrificed to larger issues of
state.
Both the President's ultimate support for a revised form of the bill as
the political context became more complicated and emotionally charged 9
and his assertion that the bill was no longer a quota bill do not now seem
likely to be remembered as acts of statesmanship. The final judgment should
not, however, turn on speculation as to what may in the end have motivated
his decision to approve the bill, but on an assessment of the balance he
struck between personal political risk and the opportunity to enhance public
understanding of the issues at stake in the legislation.
II. BAK!=, QUOTAS, AND JuDIcILu STATESMANSHI
In Bakke, the Court had been invited by the arguments of the parties
and the decisions of the courts below to address the important issue of
state the case presented by using the label "quota." Justice Powell formally
declined that invitation while proceeding to declare unconstitutional the
conduct to which the label might have been applied. In the political process,
that act without more might have been viewed as one of statesmanship-
sacrificing the opportunity to advance one's own position, by assigning to
the opposing position a convenient and powerfully negative label, and,
thereby, obliging oneself to address the issue more deeply. That act, coupled
with Powell's approval of the objective, but not the particular form, of the
challenged conduct, could be viewed in even more political terms as a
statesmanlike substantive compromise. But those views raise the question
whether the same model of statesmanship should apply to acts of judging
as apply to the more openly political acts of state. The beginning of an
answer lies in a fuller understanding of Powell's approach to the case.
Allan Bakke's case was a challenge to the constitutionality of the
"special admissions program" of the Medical School of the University of
California at Davis on the ground the program operated to exclude him
from a place in the school because he was white. In essence, the program
treated the applications of members of racial minorities who wished to be
considered under the program differently from those of white applicants,
virtually insuring that. 16 of 100 places in the entering class would be filled
by those minorities. At an early point in his opinion holding the admissions
program to be unconstitutional as structured, Justice Powell pointed to the
significance the parties attached to their respective characterizations of the
central numerical feature of the program:
19. Near the end of the legislative process the Louisiana gubernatorial campaign of
David Duke as the Republican candidate had become highly visible and included frequent
reference to quotas. At about the same time, the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the
Supreme Court encountered charges of sexual harassment and became the subject of televised
Senate hearings which then-Judge Thomas called a "high-tech lynching."
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Petitioner prefers to view it as establishing a "goal" of minority
representation in the Medical School. Respondent, echoing the
courts below, labels it a racial quota.
This semantic distinction is beside the point: The special admis-
sions program is undeniably a classification based on race and
ethnic background. To the extent that there existed a pool of at
least minimally qualified minority applicants to fill the 16 special
admissions seats, white applicants could compete only for 84 seats
in the entering class, rather than the 100 open to minority applicants.
Whether this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a
line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status. 20
Powell's refusal to accept the parties' effort to address the controversy by
drawing a distinction between quota and goal had considerable appeal; it
not only represented the rejection of a term with overwhelmingly negative
connotations but also suggested that something more substantive than
"labeling" was at stake. Nevertheless, as the opinion developed, this simple
rhetorical move instead may have represented a significant lost opportunity.
Having found that the program constituted a racial classification, Powell
went on to determine whether the program served a "permissible and
substantial" State purpose and was "necessary" to the accomplishment of
that purpose.21 After rejecting three purposes argued by the State,2 Powell
found the fourth-attainment of a diverse student body-to be "compel-
ling."' He then turned to the question whether the program was necessary
to serve this purpose and determined that it was not.
While the program focused on racial or ethnic diversity, Powell found
that the State's permissible interest in having a heterogeneous student body
was different:
It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified
percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members
of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an undif-
ferentiated aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qual-
ifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but
a single though important element. 24
Quoting with approval from a description of the Harvard College program
for diversity in admissions,25 Powell concluded that in a constitutionally
20. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288-89 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
21. Id. at 305.
22. Id. at 307-11. Powell rejected the avowed purposes of (1) reducing the historic deficit
of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession, (2)
countering the effects of societal discrimination, and (3) increasing the number of physicians
who will practice in communities currently underserved. Id.
23. Id. at 314-15.
24. Id. at 315.
25. Id. at 316-17. The quote read in part:
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permissible program "race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus'
in a particular applicant's file, yet it [can] not insulate the individual from
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.
' 26
In this description arguably lies the distinction that one might see
between the terms "quota" and "goal." It would go: A quota reserves a
fixed number of places; a goal allows a range of factors to be considered
and uses a number only as a frame of reference. But having implicitly taken
the position at the outset that there was no meaningful distinction between
quota and goal, that option was no longer available to Powell. Equally
important, Powell's characterization of the permissible program admits of
no use of numbers; race may be a factor, but how large a factor and how
that factor is to be related to other factors are left entirely unaddressed.
Presumably there is broad discretion to weigh race in the admissions process,
so long as the program is not "operate[ed] ... as a cover for the functional
equivalent of a quota system." 27
The point here, however, is not that Powell should have made more of
the quota-goal distinction or that the opinion should have held admissions
decisionmakers to a meaningful and enforceable constitutional standard in
such programs. Rather, it is that having found the numerical rigidity of the
Davis program to be its flaw, Powell chose thereafter to avoid completely
discussing the question of the role, if any, numbers might play in the
process. One easily could understand the message to be that "numbers"
should not be discussed, and, with that etiquette observed, programs aimed
at achieving diversity could proceed unobstructed by judicial intervention.
This dimension of the decision could also be viewed in political terms
as part of the previously described substantive compromise. Having ap-
proved the objective of diversity, but having rejected the particular Davis
implementation, Powell might then have gone on to explain that rejection
in terms that explicitly would have precluded any numerical frame of
reference or, instead, in terms that explicitly would have permitted some
less rigid use of numbers. If read purely as compromise, however, a part
of the compromise was to leave the role of numbers ambiguous. The
In Harvard College admissions the Committee has not set target-quotas for the
number of blacks, or of musicians, football players, physicists or Californians to be
admitted in a given year .... But that awareness [of the necessity of including
more than a token number of black students] does not mean that the Committee
sets a minimum number of blacks or of people from west of the Mississippi who
are to be admitted. It means only that in choosing among thousands of applicants
who are not only 'admissible' academically but have other strong qualities, the
Committee, with a number of criteria in mind, pays some attention to distribution
among many types and categories of students.
Id. (quoting Appendix to Brief for Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford Uni-
versity, and the University of Pennsylvania, as Amici Curiae 2-3).
26. Id. at 317. For an interesting analysis of the rhetoric of this portion of Powell's
opinion, see L.H. LaRue, The Rhetoric of Powell's Bakke, 38 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 43, 54-
61 (1981).
27. Id. at 318.
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opposing sides could find some immediate comfort in the ambiguity, and
resolution of the more difficult and sensitive details would be left for the
future. When the compromise then is evaluated as a political act, the
designation of statesmanship would continue to seem apt, but is the act
fairly regarded as one of judicial statesmanship?
Having formally rejected the quota-goal distinction, Powell had occasion
to address, at a constitutional level, the reality that numerical references
will be used in evaluating the fairness of allocation of opportunity whenever
the issue of opportunity is expressed in group terms. If nothing else, a
quantifiable measure of change is irresistible as a matter of human nature.
Whether initiated by legal requirement or by voluntary undertaking, the
success of any effort to extend opportunities to groups, even the opportunity
for individual members of the group to be considered neutrally (i.e., without
regard to group membership), will for lack of any credible alternative be
measured against the standard of the proportion of eligible (or qualified)
individual members of the group who could have been selected. Unless the
notion of what makes one eligible (or qualified) is fixed, and so soundly
fixed that under scrutiny it will admit of no discretion and withstand all
arguments of reasonable, less exclusionary alternatives, numbers will be
relevant even when the argument seems formally about eligibility or quali-
fication. But to effect the political compromise of Bakke, it was necessary
for Powell to avoid the issue of numbers. Ironically, this left the term
"quota" with its particularly negative connotations available for use in
political discourse for presumably any approach that took into account the
racial composition of an eligible pool.
Of course, Powell's immediate responsibility was to give or withhold
constitutional sanction for the underlying conduct. The traditional view of
the judicial function would have required that he make and explain that
choice and do no more. But in Bakke, Powell sought to perform a further
act-to offer a vision of policy that neither party had pressed and in doing
so to offer to the nation a compromise for dealing with one of its most
troubling problems. If it had been made in the normal political process, it
might have been criticized by purists for being incomplete or even slightly
disingenuous, but it would also have been praised by realists for the very
same reasons. And because it ultimately was based on the rejection of
divisive labels in a particularly delicate setting, it might fairly have been
viewed as an act of political statesmanship. But the context of the compro-
mise at least formally was not political; it was judicial. If it was to be
recognized as an act of statesmanship, it would be as an act of judicial,
not political, statesmanship.
How then should that distinction be drawn to evaluate Powell's com-
promise? First, it might seem important that the central method of the act
be judicial. In Bakke, Powell drew his vision of a solution from the Harvard
College admissions publication, not from the arguments of the parties or
the immediate record of the case.? If, however, this departure from tradi-
28. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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tional judicial method is to be treated as significant, its significance should
follow from the substance of the departure rather than its form. In this
instance substance is implicated to some extent. The speaker upon whom
Powell relied is in context much like a political speaker, possibly more
concerned with the public appeal of the prose than with frank and complete
description. Second, it might seem important that the act reflect some marks
of the critical analysis a court would traditionally apply to a "solution"
pressed by a litigant. In Bakke, Powell described a solution that realistically
could be implemented only with some numerical frame of reference, but he
chose to constrain the solution only with the caveat that it should not
become the "functional equivalent of a quota system." If the gap between
description and reality was too wide, the solution would have unusual
potential for breeding cynicism, particularly among lay readers in educa-
tional administration who might have expected more penetrating scrutiny
from a court. Neither of these distinctions, however, is in essence anything
other than a particularized form of the more general concern about sources
of legitimacy in judicial decisionmaking.
Thus, a choice of sorts is posed in pursuing the question of judicial
statesmanship. Is the concept one that should go more to the mediative
value of the substantive decision or more to the similar value that might
flow from the content of judicial expression? If it is the latter, statesmanship
as a distinct value in the judicial context may in essence be the willingness
to accept the opportunity to participate in framing the terms of political
discourse- even when that participation would convey some doubt as to the
completeness of one's opinion. In Bakke, Powell indirectly associated the
term "quota" with any numerical framework in a selection process while
at the same time approving a selection process that furthered racial and
ethnic diversity. The result, in terms of participation in political discourse,
was to leave a powerful negative term in a highly ambiguous posture.
It is possible, however, that the notion of judicial statesmanship is
simply a contradiction in terms. Conceptually the role of a judge in affairs
of state is circumscribed. By observing, or at least appearing to observe,
the conventions of the judicial role, the judge is generally understood to
enhance respect for his position. Political-like compromise, without more,
is vulnerable to the criticism of judicial usurpation of the functions of other
institutions of government. 29 Yet, as long as what is understood as judicial
statesmanship is firmly within the traditional judicial role, it may be difficult
to understand what really makes the act notable. Put somewhat loosely: Is
judicial statesmanship just good judging or is it more? If it is more, is it
good judging?
CONCLUSION
A part of the answer may lie in the previously described rhetoric that
controlled political discourse on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and a possible
29. See supra note 5.
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strand of relationship to Powell's Bakke. The critical issue in the Wards
Cove case was not whether numbers were relevant but how they would be
used. If one believes that using the racial composition of the relevant labor
market as a frame of reference inevitably devolves into quota-setting, then
it was the original statute itself, or at least the most well-accepted early
decisions under it, that encouraged the use of quotas. On the other hand,
if one recognizes the inevitability of this sort of frame of reference for
evaluating action under a statute aimed at providing equal opportunity for
previously excluded groups, then the inaptness of the term "quota" in its
most pejorative and offensive sense is apparent. To apply that term simply
to describe relatively subtle changes in how numbers are used, when in fact
the use of numbers was firmly established, is disingenuous at best. The
politicians applied it in this fashion and to some extent succeeded. This
application avoided the need to engage the public more frankly on how
antidiscrimination standards operate. The power of the term made that
easy. But could more have been expected from politicians? Probably not.
Too much turns on the ability to give easy answers to hard questions and
on the availability of a simple word or phase to convey that answer. To
revere statesmanship in political acts may simply be to express hope for
more.
For the judge, the traditional role gives the freedom and protection
necessary to speak more fully-to explain even where to do so reveals
discomforting complexity. But the ultimate power of the judicial act also
means the judge can effect a political compromise even if its formal rationale
is incomplete. One approach aims consciously to contribute to political
discourse, the other alms primarily to set the terms of the compromise.
Either, in a particular context, may rise above the ordinary act of judging.
Powell's Bakke does in one of those ways. It is virtually an open compromise
on an issue of state perhaps too delicate and complex to resolve any other
way. But in its most obvious area of incompleteness it continues to trouble
political discourse. In the end, it may be that to revere statesmanship in
judicial acts is no more than to express ambivalence about the appropriate
source for decisions on fundamental issues of state.
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